

2 February 1971

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Production of Military Estimates

1. Since Bruce Clarke's memorandum of 7 October, 11-8 has been completed and 11-3 is in the final stages, containing among other things the first serious attempt to assess the ASW problem the intelligence community has ever made. But the process of producing such papers has been painfully drawn out and is still far from complete: 11-14 is at a standstill following

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██████████'s rejection of three Task Force drafts and a later draft by the ONE staff, 11-10 is stacked up in line, and the final wrapup estimate on Soviet military matters will probably not be finished before work on the next annual round of papers is due to begin. This has not only wasted the time and ground down the spirits of the people concerned. It has also meant that major policy papers have had to go forward without up-to-date estimates at hand.

2. The gross dimensions of the task will probably be less formidable next time. There is not that much new information to assess and report on. Particularly if the new approach is formally blessed by Kissinger and the NSC Staff, as now appears likely, resistance within ONE will probably not assume the massive proportions of last year. Nonetheless, it would be imprudent to assume we will get away scot free. ██████████ are not the only

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ones who are likely to retain grave misgivings about one or more aspects of the new approach and to enter into the next round in a "never again" frame of mind. There will doubtless be some sympathy for DIA's continuing efforts to eliminate or water down the illustrative projections of future forces. There may also be some support for the proposal that DIA (with Danny Graham and Ted Walker in charge) be given the responsibility for drafting which it says it will seek.

3. It seems clear that CIA must insist on retaining responsibility for actually drafting the military estimates, which is one of the major services CIA has historically performed for the community. A transfer of responsibility to DIA would not only break with tradition but would seriously erode CIA control over the quality and content of the estimates. This is of special concern, particularly as people are rotated in and out of DIA over the longer term, because of DIA's vulnerability to pressures from the JCS and other interest groups in the Pentagon. Transfer of responsibility for drafting estimates would also weaken CIA's position as leader of the intelligence community in support of the multitude of military and strategic policy studies called for under the present system of decision-making. And it would lead to the proposition that, logically, State should be given responsibility for drafting political estimates.

4. It also seems clear that the DDI and the DDS&T must retain their responsibility for reviewing the substantive content of drafts sent out for coordination and of drafts presented for USIB approval--i.e., that they continue to play a more active role in the estimative process than (except for some last minute rescue operations) they did before 1970. (The only real question in this regard is whether DDI/DDS&T responsibility should be confined to the basic estimates like 11-8 and 11-3 or should be extended to SNIEs, Memos to Holders, etc. on related subject matter involving a similar requirement for close analysis.) In view of the special attention that the Administration is giving to strategic problems and the efforts of such interested parties as the JCS and DDR&E to substitute their own intelligence judgments for those of the community, it is more important than ever that the military NIEs provide a solid foundation for CIA staff work in support of policy studies and for the Director's own presentations within the Administration and to Congress. The Board of National Estimates simply cannot be counted on to respond fully to this requirement on its own.

5. Beyond this, the way in which we should proceed is far less self-evident--other than that we can't afford to do it again the same way as last time. If the producing offices in the DDI and DDS&T areas are to play a comparable role they will need better staffing and support arrangements, providing greater continuity, than can be provided on an ad hoc task force basis, as was done with 11-8 and 11-3 this last

time. This will be all the more essential if the producing offices in DDI and DDS&T are to play a major role in staffing out strategic military estimates on the USSR and China other than the basic ones like 11-8 and 11-3. It is also essential that we try to devise a relationship with ONE less prone to create friction and tension than the present one. The problem, it should be noted, has been not only with the ONE Staff but with the Board chairmen, all three of whom to date have had their own ideas about what should go into the estimate and resented the fact that the DDI/DDS&T people they were dealing with had other masters as well.

6. For various reasons, it is probably neither practical nor necessarily desirable to take responsibility for coordinating the military estimates away from the Board of National Estimates. The problem thus narrows to the question of how responsibility for drafting and staffing the estimates, and for providing staff support to the Board during the off-season, should be handled. It should be pointed out that this is no small undertaking, even though not enough to justify the full-time seven-man SMT Staff

25X1A9a [REDACTED] presided over before he left. During the six months or so involved in putting out 11-8, three task force people were involved on almost a continuous overtime basis--myself, an experienced analyst from the Strategic Attack Branch of OSR, and a senior drafter-coordinator from FMSAC. In the case of 11-3,

25X1A9a [REDACTED] has had major drafting assistance from two OSR branch chiefs, one of whom was completely separated from other responsibilities until he had turned out a draft. This of course refers only to the direct investment of manpower in the drafting and not to the large amount of backup work done throughout the process by the offices concerned.

7. As I see it there are four basic types of arrangement that might be considered, none without disadvantages. The choices available, with their pros and cons, are summarized below:

- a. Return drafting responsibility to the ONE Staff, with the DDI and DDS&T role limited to preparation of contributions, participation in review and coordination sessions, and vetting of drafts at key stages as called for in Para. 4 above.

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Pros

- Would minimize demand on DDI and DDS& T personnel resources
- Would reduce opportunities for in-house friction during review and coordination.
- Would weaken DIA claim to equal or preferred status in drafting, since drafting would be assigned to a central staff rather than one of contributors

Cons

- Would reduce DDI/DDS&T leverage, making it easier for ONE to go back to its old ways.
- Would probably be taken as a setback to the idea of a new approach, possibly encouraging the view that DDI/DDS&T just weren't capable of handling the assignment.
- Could lead to disarray and unresolved differences between DDI and DDS&T contributors unless contributions were carefully coordinated.

b. Establish a separate year round DDI/DDS&T Military Estimates Staff, preferably located physically in OSR, to draft military estimates, while retaining a SMT Staff in ONE.

- Would provide orderly basis for producing coordinated DDI/DDS&T input to estimates.
- Would still tie up key DDI/DDS&T people for 1/3 or more of their time (four months or so per estimate)
- Would keep DDI/DDS&T people free of handholding chores and of direct subordination to Board of National Estimates.
- There would be opportunities for friction with ONE similar to those under ad hoc arrangements of 1970.
- Since most business other than actual work on the estimates would be handled by SMT staff, DDI/DDS&T Estimates Staff could be manned fairly austere when estimates not in preparation.
- Would encourage competitive drafting, perhaps leaning on DIA contributions.

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c. Establish a separate DDI/DDS&T Military Estimates Staff as above but in this case abolish ONE SMT Staff, allocating slots to DDI/DDS&T and all present responsibilities to new Military Estimates Staff.

Pros

- No separate ONE Staff to compete, facilitating DDI/DDS&T control of content of estimates.
- More effective utilization of manpower since most Estimates Staff members could be returned to parent offices or given other assignments when not involved in estimative work.

Cons

- Would increase demands on time of key personnel assigned, since ONE would want briefings and expert comments as occasion arose throughout year.
- Would probably involve some jockeying and friction, at least initially, since Board would probably wish to establish its authority and would probably look to its DIA alumni for competing ideas.

d. Enlarge on Option C so as to provide a broadened full time DDI/DDS&T Military Estimates Staff responsible not only for NIE drafts but for support of military NSSM and DPRC studies. (SALT support operations would presumably have to remain separate but would levy on Estimates Staff as required).

- Would recognize extent of CIA commitment to production of papers on policy-related military intelligence subjects in contrast to traditional research and reporting per se.
- Would involve more drastic organizational and administrative changes and hence new problems and choices:
 - Important not to create another "two societies" division between researcher/reporter element and estimates project officers.

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Pros

Cons

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| <p>--Would facilitate insuring consistency between NIE and policy support inputs</p> <p>--Would provide mechanism for drawing BNE or, preferably, selected members into policy support work.</p> | <p>--Qualified people hard to find.</p> <p>--Where do we get the money and slots?</p> <p>--Would probably look like empire building in some quarters.</p> <p>--Board involvement in NSSMs might not be unmixed blessing.</p> |
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8. This memorandum has been reviewed by Bruce Clarke.

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Executive Officer
Strategic Research

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